2.0 -//Pentabarf//Schedule//EN PUBLISH WLMELT@@darkmode.securityalliance.org -WLMELT Welcome to darkMode en en 20260216T094500 20260216T095000 000500

Welcome to darkMode

PUBLIC CONFIRMED Short Talk https://darkmode.securityalliance.org/darkmode-2026/talk/WLMELT/ Auditorium samczsun PUBLISH CFCU37@@darkmode.securityalliance.org -CFCU37 Old Hacks Targeting New Industries: How to Balance User Privacy and Security en en 20260216T095000 20260216T101000 002000

Old Hacks Targeting New Industries: How to Balance User Privacy and Security

In this talk, we will discuss common cyber threats facing web3 firms and the security controls that can stop them. Topics include: Identity and access management: conditional access, device posture checking Ways to deploy security controls on end-user machines while respecting user privacy Conducting due-diligence checks on a multinational, contractor-led workforce, insider threat protections and social engineering awareness Managing IT infrastructure such as servers, laptops and phones, including logging and monitoring PUBLIC CONFIRMED Short Talk https://darkmode.securityalliance.org/darkmode-2026/talk/CFCU37/ Auditorium Andrew Chang-Gu PUBLISH UDCWH3@@darkmode.securityalliance.org -UDCWH3 Safeguarding Your Digital Footprint: A Privacy-First Approach to Web3 OPsec en en 20260216T101000 20260216T103000 002000

Safeguarding Your Digital Footprint: A Privacy-First Approach to Web3 OPsec

As you move through the world, your devices connect to wireless networks and collect unique identifiers. Your mobile devices may be broadcasting these sensitive artifacts, possibly personally identifiable information (PII), through probes and beacons. These wireless signals can be combined with open-source intelligence (OSINT) to compromise your privacy, revealing your travel history, physical location, and even the existence and location of your hardware wallets. This data is an asset to malicious actors: enabling pretexting for social engineers, exposing daily routines to physical attackers, or providing partnering information to data-hungry degens. This workshop demonstrates a privacy-focused security paradigm for the Web3 space. It moves beyond on-chain contracts to detail the off-chain vulnerabilities in Wi-Fi and Bluetooth signals. Learn how to collect and analyze potentially sensitive wireless signals. Examine your digital footprint in a way an attacker would. We will also discuss practical mitigation strategies and best practices necessary to secure your wireless devices, protect your personal safety, and ensure the operational integrity of your Web3 projects in a world where physical and digital security are inextricably linked. To participate in this workshop, please bring a Macbook, Linux Laptop with a wireless card that supports monitor mode, or an Android device. PUBLIC CONFIRMED Closed Room Session https://darkmode.securityalliance.org/darkmode-2026/talk/UDCWH3/ Auditorium Benjamin Speckien PUBLISH CYHTKN@@darkmode.securityalliance.org -CYHTKN TOTP apps are dead and why you are doing 2FA wrong en en 20260216T103000 20260216T105000 002000

TOTP apps are dead and why you are doing 2FA wrong

I will present a summary of how 2FA works, the different methods (SMS, TOTP apps, Yubikeys, Passkeys, etc), the weaknesses each one of them have, how they are being exploited, and what we have to do in order to start using 2FA in a safe way. PUBLIC CONFIRMED Short Talk https://darkmode.securityalliance.org/darkmode-2026/talk/CYHTKN/ Auditorium Pablo Sabbatella PUBLISH 7ZHSK9@@darkmode.securityalliance.org -7ZHSK9 Get off my lawn: you're forgettin' your web2 security risk, young whippersnapper en en 20260216T105000 20260216T111000 002000

Get off my lawn: you're forgettin' your web2 security risk, young whippersnapper

PUBLIC CONFIRMED Short Talk https://darkmode.securityalliance.org/darkmode-2026/talk/7ZHSK9/ Auditorium J.M. Porup PUBLISH P8GGKC@@darkmode.securityalliance.org -P8GGKC Inside Immunefi’s Highest-Paying Bug Bounties of 2025 en en 20260216T111000 20260216T113000 002000

Inside Immunefi’s Highest-Paying Bug Bounties of 2025

This talk is structured around a small number of high-impact 2025 case studies, including: - The technical root cause of some of the largest bounty payouts of the year - How these vulnerabilities could have been exploited in the wild - What made these reports stand out and qualify for top-tier rewards Each case is anonymized or based on information approved for public disclosure, and is used to extract concrete lessons for: - Whitehats looking to focus on high-impact targets - Protocol teams aiming to prevent catastrophic bugs - The goal is to give attendees a realistic picture of what “critical” actually looks like in 2025 crypto systems. PUBLIC CONFIRMED Short Talk https://darkmode.securityalliance.org/darkmode-2026/talk/P8GGKC/ Auditorium Alejandro Munoz-McDonald PUBLISH ESCYXL@@darkmode.securityalliance.org -ESCYXL When the AppleJeus GitHub is Worth The Squeeze en en 20260216T113000 20260216T115000 002000

When the AppleJeus GitHub is Worth The Squeeze

This talk will have a little bit of everything! Collaboration between different North Korean hacking groups! Involvement in hacking by North Korean IT workers! Activity across platforms including GitHub, NPM, PyPI, Twitter, and Discord! PUBLIC CONFIRMED Short Talk https://darkmode.securityalliance.org/darkmode-2026/talk/ESCYXL/ Auditorium Daniel Gordon PUBLISH JNGY3E@@darkmode.securityalliance.org -JNGY3E SEAL Certifications: A Collaborative Framework for Maturity in Crypto Security en en 20260216T130000 20260216T132000 002000

SEAL Certifications: A Collaborative Framework for Maturity in Crypto Security

PUBLIC CONFIRMED Short Talk https://darkmode.securityalliance.org/darkmode-2026/talk/JNGY3E/ Auditorium Isaac Patka PUBLISH UVLUSC@@darkmode.securityalliance.org -UVLUSC Trafficked Trust: The Human Cost of Crypto Scams en en 20260216T132000 20260216T134000 002000

Trafficked Trust: The Human Cost of Crypto Scams

PUBLIC CONFIRMED Short Talk https://darkmode.securityalliance.org/darkmode-2026/talk/UVLUSC/ Auditorium dobs PUBLISH DTHPTP@@darkmode.securityalliance.org -DTHPTP TheDAO Security Fund en en 20260216T134000 20260216T140000 002000

TheDAO Security Fund

PUBLIC CONFIRMED Short Talk https://darkmode.securityalliance.org/darkmode-2026/talk/DTHPTP/ Auditorium Griff Green PUBLISH AZ77PD@@darkmode.securityalliance.org -AZ77PD The CPIMP Backdoor: Anatomy of a Multi-Chain Proxy Attack en en 20260216T141000 20260216T143000 002000

The CPIMP Backdoor: Anatomy of a Multi-Chain Proxy Attack

This talk unpacks the CPIMP (Clandestine Proxy In the Middle of Proxy) attack, a stealthy, highly sophisticated DeFi vulnerability that threatened millions of dollars across dozens of protocols and multiple EVM chains. CPIMPs masqueraded as legitimate proxy contracts while embedding persistent backdoors, often lying dormant for months until optimal conditions arose. The attacker employed advanced evasion techniques, including spoofed events, dummy storage writes, and aggressive anti-recovery logic, successfully deceiving common analysis workflows and even public explorers. We’ll walk through how Dedaub reverse-engineered the attack, identified affected deployments, and led a coordinated, multi-chain mitigation effort through SEAL 911. The session distills practical lessons on detecting deeply hidden threats, responding under time pressure, and maintaining continuous monitoring across chains. PUBLIC CONFIRMED Short Talk https://darkmode.securityalliance.org/darkmode-2026/talk/AZ77PD/ Auditorium Neville Grech PUBLISH PBPFE3@@darkmode.securityalliance.org -PBPFE3 Stopping the Rubber Hose Attack: Hot Takes en en 20260216T143000 20260216T151500 004500

Stopping the Rubber Hose Attack: Hot Takes

The panel will provide their hot takes and deep wisdom on these questions: How do we increase the attackers costs and risks, and reduce the odds of profit? What methods can prevent/slow/reduce fund transfer can be done safely, without undue risk? Would you rather a remote multisig that would never sign if your under duress, or would sign to pay the ransom? What methods to bring help (police/private security) can help with safety, with undue risk How can we establish norms and widely held understandings to create a disincentive for the attacker to try? How can one hide their holdings from the public in a transparent blockchain world? What can we learn from the history with fiat, where home invasion and the rubber hose is not as frequent Not common in CashApp/Venmo/Wires etc. Kidnapping for fiat ransom is an analogy, usually target very wealthy Shorter term kidnapping for a ride to ATMs Can you tech your way out of the problem by being super clever? Dummy accounts, honey pots, tainted transfers PUBLIC CONFIRMED Panel https://darkmode.securityalliance.org/darkmode-2026/talk/PBPFE3/ Auditorium smagdali Kurt Opsahl Elliot PUBLISH 9YPLDE@@darkmode.securityalliance.org -9YPLDE Bypassing Cloaking when Hunting Phishing Sites en en 20260216T151500 20260216T153500 002000

Bypassing Cloaking when Hunting Phishing Sites

PUBLIC CONFIRMED Short Talk https://darkmode.securityalliance.org/darkmode-2026/talk/9YPLDE/ Auditorium Nikita Varabei PUBLISH JQBPDF@@darkmode.securityalliance.org -JQBPDF Mastering Security through Simple Machines: How Consistency, Not Complexity, Drives Innovation en en 20260216T153500 20260216T155500 002000

Mastering Security through Simple Machines: How Consistency, Not Complexity, Drives Innovation

**1. Introduction: The Problem with Complexity in Security** - The security industry often adopts development frameworks, such as DevOps, and layers security onto them, creating frameworks like DevSecOps. - The issue: security processes are frequently complex and inefficient compared to streamlined development processes. - Key point: You can't automate something that is inefficient. Applying generative AI or advanced tooling to broken processes won’t fix them. - Outcome: This leads to frustration, bottlenecks, and unmet security goals. **2. The Analogy: Security Processes as Simple Machines** - Introduction to simple machines: lever, wheel, pulley, etc. - Simple machines represent fundamental tools that evolve through mastery and incremental improvement. - Just as a lever becomes more efficient when transformed into a wheel or pulley, security processes must evolve through optimization. - Example: A long, inefficient SAST (Static Application Security Testing) scan taking two days doesn’t fit into a two-week sprint. Simply automating it doesn’t solve the problem; instead, the process itself must be optimized. **3. Evolution of Security Processes through Consistency and Optimization** - Consistency is key: innovation stems from mastery and consistent refinement, not from one-time application of advanced tools. - Case study: Improving SAST scans - Initial state: A full SAST scan that takes two days to complete. - Optimization: Breaking the scan into targeted components, running incremental scans, or using real-time feedback tools. - Result: A faster, more efficient process that integrates seamlessly into the development lifecycle. - Key takeaway: The goal is not to add complexity but to create efficiency through iteration. **4. The Futility of Applying AI to Broken Processes** - Generative AI and other advanced technologies can enhance efficient processes but cannot fix broken ones. - Example: Applying AI to prioritize vulnerabilities from an inefficient scanning process will still result in a flood of low-value alerts. - Solution: Fix the underlying process first, then enhance it with automation and AI. **5. Practical Steps to Achieve Process Mastery** - Identify inefficiencies: Audit current security processes to find bottlenecks and pain points. - Apply incremental improvements: Start with small changes and measure their impact. - Leverage automation only after optimization: Use tools to enhance an already efficient process. - Foster a culture of continuous improvement: Encourage teams to regularly review and refine processes. **6. The Path Forward: Consistency as a Driver of Innovation** - Innovation doesn’t come from adding complexity; it comes from consistently improving simple, well-understood processes. - Just as simple machines evolved over time into more complex but efficient systems, security processes must evolve through incremental mastery. - Final analogy: A poorly applied lever remains inefficient regardless of how much force is applied; a well-crafted pulley system, however, can lift tremendous weight with minimal effort. **7. Key Takeaways for the Audience** - Stop trying to automate inefficiency: Focus on optimizing the underlying process first. - Consistency drives innovation: Regular, incremental improvements lead to breakthroughs. - Simplicity is powerful: Don’t overcomplicate security; instead, seek mastery of foundational processes. **8. Closing Thoughts and Call to Action** - Challenge to attendees: Audit one core security process in your organization and identify an inefficiency. Implement one small, consistent change and measure the impact. - Final words: True security innovation comes not from flashy tools but from mastering the basics and improving them consistently over time. PUBLIC CONFIRMED Short Talk https://darkmode.securityalliance.org/darkmode-2026/talk/JQBPDF/ Auditorium Ken Toler PUBLISH NYFCXC@@darkmode.securityalliance.org -NYFCXC Security Between the Code: Why Technical Excellence Can Fail en en 20260216T155500 20260216T161500 002000

Security Between the Code: Why Technical Excellence Can Fail

Purpose and Value This presentation is designed to respect the time and expertise of security professionals. It does not seek to explain technology to technologists, nor to moralise security practice. Instead, it aims to: Reframe familiar problems with analytical clarity Surface high-impact dynamics that are widely experienced but rarely formalised Offer a shared language for discussing coordination, incentives, and legitimacy in decentralised security The primary objective is practical: to provide conceptual tools that help practitioners better understand why certain security interventions succeed, stall, or repeatedly re-emerge in new forms. Audience: Security engineers and incident responders Security researchers and threat-intelligence professionals Protocol teams and infrastructure operators Policy and governance specialists engaging decentralised systems Other presenter: Matta, The Red Guild PUBLIC CONFIRMED Short Talk https://darkmode.securityalliance.org/darkmode-2026/talk/NYFCXC/ Auditorium Kelsie Nabben matta PUBLISH DQ3T8W@@darkmode.securityalliance.org -DQ3T8W Why Your Multisig Won't Save You: Attacks Against High-Value Holders en en 20260216T161500 20260216T170000 004500

Why Your Multisig Won't Save You: Attacks Against High-Value Holders

Large crypto holders face well-resourced adversaries using attack vectors that multisig alone cannot address. This talk walks through six categories of threat: simulation spoofing, address poisoning, frontend compromises, supply chain attacks, insider threats, and kidnapping or duress scenarios. Each attack exploits a common weakness: the finality of signed transactions and the opacity of what's actually being approved. We'll examine real incidents, break down why existing solutions fail, and introduce a defense framework centered on post-signature review windows and cancellation authority. The session concludes with a demonstration of Kleidi, a wallet implementation that operationalizes this framework through timelocks, policy engines, and guardian services. Attendees will leave with a threat model they can apply to custody architecture reviews and a concrete reference for how reversibility changes the security calculus. PUBLIC CONFIRMED Long Talk https://darkmode.securityalliance.org/darkmode-2026/talk/DQ3T8W/ Auditorium Elliot PUBLISH 7FKKPQ@@darkmode.securityalliance.org -7FKKPQ When Agents Get Tools: Security for Autonomous Systems en en 20260217T093000 20260217T101500 004500

When Agents Get Tools: Security for Autonomous Systems

Agents are everywhere now. They're in our workflows, they're talking to each other, and some of them have wallets. Most conversations about this are either hype or hand-wraving. This one won't be. We've assembled panelists who genuinely disagree on where the risks are and how to handle them. Some think crypto's hard-won security lessons translate directly. Others aren't convinced. Some see agent-to-agent communication as the real threat vector. Others worry more about what happens when an agent can spend money without asking. We'll get into the uncomfortable questions. Can an agent be socially engineered? If one agent infects another through shared tooling, whose problem is that? When autonomy is the feature, how do you even define containment? And can we flip the script entirely, using adversarial agents as security tools rather than threats? No consensus guaranteed. Come ready to think. PUBLIC CONFIRMED Panel https://darkmode.securityalliance.org/darkmode-2026/talk/7FKKPQ/ Auditorium Consensys Diligence Andrew MacPherson (AndrewMohawk) '<#<h1> Alex Stokes PUBLISH KL3EBP@@darkmode.securityalliance.org -KL3EBP LLM Auditing, Better Than Cats? en en 20260217T101500 20260217T103500 002000

LLM Auditing, Better Than Cats?

PUBLIC CONFIRMED Short Talk https://darkmode.securityalliance.org/darkmode-2026/talk/KL3EBP/ Auditorium Everett Hildenbrandt PUBLISH JZASGB@@darkmode.securityalliance.org -JZASGB Co-Auditing With AI: Practical Techniques en en 20260217T103500 20260217T105500 002000

Co-Auditing With AI: Practical Techniques

This talk shares how we use AI agents as co-auditors to amplify individual reviewers, not replace them. We focus on a practical framework built inside our audit workflow: - **Tool-aware agents** that can invoke hard technical tools - static analyzers, code mappers, and protocol helpers - rather than rely on raw text prompting. - **Primer-driven behavior**, where auditors define how the agent should think, interpret code, and execute repeatable methodology across domains like lending, staking, and accounting. - **Artifact generation** that persists throughout the engagement - from initial scoping and code mapping to end-stage issue drafting - allowing humans and the agent to build on shared context as the audit progresses. The core idea is that these systems let auditors bring their own expertise into the workflow. Teams can create private primers, encode their specialties, and optionally share them with the broader community to lift everyone’s capability. The goal is a future where every auditor can use AI to multiply the value of their own judgment - without ceding control to automation. PUBLIC CONFIRMED Short Talk https://darkmode.securityalliance.org/darkmode-2026/talk/JZASGB/ Auditorium George Kobakhidze PUBLISH G7B9P8@@darkmode.securityalliance.org -G7B9P8 From vibes to vulnerabilities en en 20260217T105500 20260217T114000 004500

From vibes to vulnerabilities

This talk starts from a failure. As a long time blue team practitioner with no vulnerability research background, I tried to use OpenAI Codex to find a real-world RCE that had just dropped—and got absolutely nowhere. What followed was confusion, false positives, and confidently wrong model output. But once I stopped treating Codex like a one-shot bug oracle and started using it as a deeply opinionated debugging assistant, things began to click. The session walks through how I used “vibes” to find vulnerabilities: from being the annoying kid in the back seat asking “why?” a hundred times, to forcing the model to reason more deeply about code paths, assumptions, and edge cases until something real fell out. I'll walk through the pain and the pleasure of using LLMs for vulnerability discovery, including how this approach led to real findings across projects like React, Node, Ollama, Tethers Password manager, wordpress, supabase, etc. We'll talk candidly about where models get stuck, how to work around refusals, why the dumbest ideas sometimes work best, and just how creative—and unhinged—you can get when you stop trusting the model and start interrogating it. I'll also show how this fundamentally changes offensive capability and why it feels like red teams are about to get a serious advantage. The talk closes with a sober look at the current limitations, the risks, and the broader impact on the security community. The goal isn't to teach exploit development, but to show that with basic debugging skills and the right guardrails, AI can meaningfully assist in finding real vulnerabilities—and dramatically lower the barrier to entry for vulnerability research. PUBLIC CONFIRMED Long Talk https://darkmode.securityalliance.org/darkmode-2026/talk/G7B9P8/ Auditorium Andrew MacPherson (AndrewMohawk) '<#<h1> PUBLISH ETHYXP@@darkmode.securityalliance.org -ETHYXP How we stop North Korea getting away with the next Billion: Next generation of security professional coordination and new high speed threat intel network. en en 20260217T124000 20260217T130000 002000

How we stop North Korea getting away with the next Billion: Next generation of security professional coordination and new high speed threat intel network.

PUBLIC CONFIRMED Short Talk https://darkmode.securityalliance.org/darkmode-2026/talk/ETHYXP/ Auditorium Casey G Col G PUBLISH MLLQAQ@@darkmode.securityalliance.org -MLLQAQ Attack Chains in Web3: Lessons from Multi‑Stage Web3 Exploits en en 20260217T130000 20260217T134500 004500

Attack Chains in Web3: Lessons from Multi‑Stage Web3 Exploits

PUBLIC CONFIRMED Long Talk https://darkmode.securityalliance.org/darkmode-2026/talk/MLLQAQ/ Auditorium Sebastian Banescu PUBLISH BJJM8V@@darkmode.securityalliance.org -BJJM8V TraderTraitor: A Real Bad MATA en en 20260217T134500 20260217T140500 002000

TraderTraitor: A Real Bad MATA

North Korea loves stealing crypto. This presentation is a deep dive into TraderTraitor, North Korea's most effective hacking group. This presentation will explore how TraderTraitor compromises cryptocurrency exchanges, wallet service providers, and cloud companies in order to steal massive amounts of cryptocurrency including the ByBit heist where they walked away with $1.5 Billion worth of Ethereum. While TraderTraitor is incredibly effective at stealing cryptocurrency for North Korea, a few security measures can help protect your organization, and your service providers, from this threat actor. PUBLIC CONFIRMED Short Talk https://darkmode.securityalliance.org/darkmode-2026/talk/BJJM8V/ Auditorium Daniel Gordon PUBLISH QUX7KW@@darkmode.securityalliance.org -QUX7KW When the Supply Chain Isn’t Chaining: Stop Reinventing the Wheel en en 20260217T141500 20260217T143500 002000

When the Supply Chain Isn’t Chaining: Stop Reinventing the Wheel

PUBLIC CONFIRMED Short Talk https://darkmode.securityalliance.org/darkmode-2026/talk/QUX7KW/ Auditorium Nikita Belenkov PUBLISH URDMBC@@darkmode.securityalliance.org -URDMBC Lido V3: Security by Design en en 20260217T143500 20260217T145500 002000

Lido V3: Security by Design

Attendees will learn how protocol design decisions shape security outcomes and how security first architecture prevents entire classes of DeFi bugs PUBLIC CONFIRMED Short Talk https://darkmode.securityalliance.org/darkmode-2026/talk/URDMBC/ Auditorium Tomer Ganor PUBLISH TT3GRQ@@darkmode.securityalliance.org -TT3GRQ From Chaos to Containment: Making Incident Response Actually Work in the Digital Asset Economy en en 20260217T145500 20260217T154000 004500

From Chaos to Containment: Making Incident Response Actually Work in the Digital Asset Economy

Incident Response is where the digital economy defensive layer succeeds or fails, but it is still underdeveloped across the industry. This panel focuses on turning MDR/IR from a reactive approach into reliable operational capability. We’ll dig into: What the first 60 minutes of real incidents actually look like and why they matter How teams are building MDR workflows that merge on-chain + off-chain telemetry How playbooks and containment strategies can change the outcome What the industry consistently gets wrong about response today How collaboration and threat intelligence meaningfully reduce impact Attendees will leave with actionable frameworks, hard-earned lessons, and new thinking on how we can collectively raise the baseline of defense in crypto. Panelists (proposed): representatives from Cantina, Hypernative, and ChainPatrol Moderator: Mike Leffer, President of Cantina/Spearbit PUBLIC CONFIRMED Panel https://darkmode.securityalliance.org/darkmode-2026/talk/TT3GRQ/ Auditorium Cantina Sharon Ideguchi PUBLISH THSJYH@@darkmode.securityalliance.org -THSJYH Crazy Chains: Why Incident Response Breaks Outside the EVM en en 20260217T154000 20260217T160000 002000

Crazy Chains: Why Incident Response Breaks Outside the EVM

PUBLIC CONFIRMED Short Talk https://darkmode.securityalliance.org/darkmode-2026/talk/THSJYH/ Auditorium Ken Toler PUBLISH UX3RPF@@darkmode.securityalliance.org -UX3RPF Web3 Security's Evolution for Mainstream Adoption en en 20260217T160000 20260217T164500 004500

Web3 Security's Evolution for Mainstream Adoption

Mainstream adoption isn't just about better UI; it’s about a fundamental shift in how we manage risk. This session brings together security architects from both the "move fast" world of DeFi and the "zero-fail" world of institutions to discuss the practical realities of securing a global ecosystem. The Evolution of the Stack: Scaling Security: How do we transition from one-off smart contract audits to continuous, real-time security monitoring and automated response? The User Experience Paradox: Discussing the shift from the burden of seed phrases to invisible security like MPC, TEEs and Account Abstraction—and whether we’re introducing new risks in the process. Operational Maturity: Why OpSec (key management, governance, and internal controls) is becoming the most critical failure point as organizations move on-chain. What Stays the Same: Identifying the "load-bearing" pillars of Web3—like zero-trust and cryptographic proofs—that must survive the leap to the mainstream. PUBLIC CONFIRMED Panel https://darkmode.securityalliance.org/darkmode-2026/talk/UX3RPF/ Auditorium Michael Lewellen Anto Andrew MacPherson (AndrewMohawk) '<#<h1> Mooly Sagiv PUBLISH VDPMHS@@darkmode.securityalliance.org -VDPMHS Protecting Keys and Compute with Secure Enclaves en en 20260217T164500 20260217T170500 002000

Protecting Keys and Compute with Secure Enclaves

PUBLIC CONFIRMED Short Talk https://darkmode.securityalliance.org/darkmode-2026/talk/VDPMHS/ Auditorium Michael Lewellen PUBLISH NEHCVJ@@darkmode.securityalliance.org -NEHCVJ Decoding the DC Politics of Crypto Privacy en en 20260218T120000 20260218T122500 002500

Decoding the DC Politics of Crypto Privacy

PUBLIC CONFIRMED Panel https://darkmode.securityalliance.org/darkmode-2026/talk/NEHCVJ/ Auditorium PUBLISH FUUDPW@@darkmode.securityalliance.org -FUUDPW State of Surveillance en en 20260218T122500 20260218T124000 001500

State of Surveillance

PUBLIC CONFIRMED Short Talk https://darkmode.securityalliance.org/darkmode-2026/talk/FUUDPW/ Auditorium PUBLISH 8LQSUJ@@darkmode.securityalliance.org -8LQSUJ Non-Custodial? Not Really! Misconceptions in Key Management en en 20260218T124000 20260218T125500 001500

Non-Custodial? Not Really! Misconceptions in Key Management

PUBLIC CONFIRMED Short Talk https://darkmode.securityalliance.org/darkmode-2026/talk/8LQSUJ/ Auditorium PUBLISH L7P9WS@@darkmode.securityalliance.org -L7P9WS Keynote: Ameen Soleimani en en 20260218T125500 20260218T131000 001500

Keynote: Ameen Soleimani

PUBLIC CONFIRMED Short Talk https://darkmode.securityalliance.org/darkmode-2026/talk/L7P9WS/ Auditorium PUBLISH DAHPWV@@darkmode.securityalliance.org -DAHPWV Keynote: Alexander Wilke en en 20260218T131000 20260218T132500 001500

Keynote: Alexander Wilke

PUBLIC CONFIRMED Short Talk https://darkmode.securityalliance.org/darkmode-2026/talk/DAHPWV/ Auditorium PUBLISH HSMC3Y@@darkmode.securityalliance.org -HSMC3Y Proofless Consensus and Client-Side Validation en en 20260218T132500 20260218T134000 001500

Proofless Consensus and Client-Side Validation

PUBLIC CONFIRMED Short Talk https://darkmode.securityalliance.org/darkmode-2026/talk/HSMC3Y/ Auditorium PUBLISH 8H88ZS@@darkmode.securityalliance.org -8H88ZS Fireside: Zcash's Zooko Wilcox en en 20260218T134000 20260218T140000 002000

Fireside: Zcash's Zooko Wilcox

PUBLIC CONFIRMED Panel https://darkmode.securityalliance.org/darkmode-2026/talk/8H88ZS/ Auditorium PUBLISH ALEX7U@@darkmode.securityalliance.org -ALEX7U Keynote: Zak Cole en en 20260218T140000 20260218T141500 001500

Keynote: Zak Cole

PUBLIC CONFIRMED Short Talk https://darkmode.securityalliance.org/darkmode-2026/talk/ALEX7U/ Auditorium PUBLISH FL8VYA@@darkmode.securityalliance.org -FL8VYA Crypto Lost the Plot: How Blockchain Forgot Its Own Canon en en 20260218T141500 20260218T143500 002000

Crypto Lost the Plot: How Blockchain Forgot Its Own Canon

PUBLIC CONFIRMED Short Talk https://darkmode.securityalliance.org/darkmode-2026/talk/FL8VYA/ Auditorium PUBLISH ZSTD3M@@darkmode.securityalliance.org -ZSTD3M The Infrastructure Capital Markets Need to Go Onchain en en 20260218T143500 20260218T145000 001500

The Infrastructure Capital Markets Need to Go Onchain

PUBLIC CONFIRMED Short Talk https://darkmode.securityalliance.org/darkmode-2026/talk/ZSTD3M/ Auditorium PUBLISH MSKFFY@@darkmode.securityalliance.org -MSKFFY Stablecoin Endgame: Programmable Privacy en en 20260218T145000 20260218T152000 003000

Stablecoin Endgame: Programmable Privacy

PUBLIC CONFIRMED Long Talk https://darkmode.securityalliance.org/darkmode-2026/talk/MSKFFY/ Auditorium